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The main aim of this paper is to test the validity of the stakeholder approach in a historical context (16th and 
17th century), very different to the one in which the theory was originally developed and has normally been 
used. For this purpose, the paper deals with management in the Osuna Ducal Estate at the end of the 16th 
century and beginning of the 17th century. In that period, the Ducal Estate reached such a high level of 
indebtedness  that  creditors  could  not  even  collect  the  interest  on  their  loans.  This  led  them  to  lodge  a 
complaint with the Crown and consequently, as of 1590, the Ducal Estate patrimony was seized by the 
Government. Since the changes that occurred in the ODE patrimony were promoted by creditors and the 
Crown, the stakeholder approach has been applied to analyse the case. We can conclude that stakeholder 
approach is sufficiently able to explain the changes that took place in the management of the Osuna Ducal 
Estate in the 16th and 17th century and, mainly, the role of accounting in these changes. 





With financial support of ECO 2008-06052: “Accounting as a Social and Institutional Practice: Past and 
Present Analysis”,: Spanish Science Ministry and SEJ 4129  “Andalusia, Crossing of cultures. A View from 
Accounting”, Andalusian Regional Government 
  3 
 
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
D e p a r t a m e n t o   d e   
D i r e c c i ó n   d e   E m p r e s a s
THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN ACCOUNTING OF PRIVATE 





“The  stakeholders  approach  is  about  groups  and  individuals  who  can  affect  the 
organization  and  is  about  managerial  behaviour  taken  in  response  to  those  groups  and 
individuals” (Freeman, 1984, p. 48). This definition by Freeman can be considered the first 
step in the stakeholder approach. In order to identify stakeholders, Freeman added “any 
group  or  individual  who  can  affect  or  is  affected  by  the  achievement  of  the  firm’s 
objectives” (1984, p. 25).  
  Stakeholders approach has been used in accounting research, especially for the study 
of the social and environmental accounting, and fundamentally for cases of organizations 
with spirit of profit. Nevertheless, its validity has not been tested for the analysis of the role 
of accounting in private patrimonies.  
  Besides, the stakeholder approach has not been used frequently to study historic cases. 
We can quote two recent studies: i) the paper by Chandar and Miranti Jr (2007) on the 
process of firm-specific learning relating to the development of actuarially based pension 
accounting at the Bell System in the USA from 1913 to 1940 and ii) the work by Cámara et 
al. (2009) on the evolution of annual reports of the Spanish Tobacco Monopoly between 
1887-1986 as answer to the changing requirements of the stakeholders. 
  This  paper  deals  with  changes  happened  in  accounting  and  management  in  the 
Osuna Ducal Estate (hereinafter ODE), one of the most important Spanish Aristocratic 
organizations, during the end of the 16
th century and first part of the 17th. Thus, the case  
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allows to us to test the accuracy of stakeholder approach to explain changes in accounting 
and management in private patrimonies and in historical contexts. 
  Aristocratic organizations were one of the more important private organizations in 
the history of the Spanish economy. In the epoch of the first three Austrias the king, the 
clergy and the nobility were possessing 95 % of the land in Spain (Reglá, 1974).In this 
way, 40 % of the land in Andalusia in the 17
th century was in aristocrats' hands (Bernal, 
1983). In addition, Aristocratic Estates involving the transfer of public competitions in 
matters  of  administration  and  government,  justice  and  taxes  (Atienza,  1987).  So, 




  However, little research has been conducted into the management of aristocratic 
estates  as  several  authors  have  pointed  out  (for  instance,  Ezzamel,  2002;  Hernandez 
Esteve, 2008). As far as Spain is concerned, Hernández Esteve (2005) pointed out that, in 
spite of its interest, accounting of the Aristocratic Estates and of landowners continues 
being a "minimally explored" topic. 
  At the end of 16
th century, ODE reached such a high level of indebtedness that 
creditors  could  not  even  collect  the  interest  on  their  loans.  This  led  them  to  lodge  a 
complaint with the Crown and consequently, as of 1590, the Ducal Estate patrimony was 
seized and managed by the Government. Therefore, the Government set out a series of the 
rules to manage the ODE patrimony. However they did not manage it directly but rather 
auctioned it off publically or appointed administrators. 
  Since the changes that occurred in the ODE patrimony were promoted by creditors 
and the Crown (agents who can influence on and be influenced by the organization, ODE), 
we have used the stakeholder approach has been applied to analyse the case. From its  
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analysis,  we  can  extract  that  stakeholder  approach  can  be  used  to  explain  the  role  of 
accounting in the management of private patrimonies and in a very previous historical 
period to in that till now it has used. 
  The  primary  sources  used  in  this  research  had  been  taken  from  the  National 
Historical Archive, Nobility Section, (hereinafter SNAHN) housed in the Tavera Hospital, 
Toledo,  and  the  Public  Archive  of  Osuna  in  the  collection  from  the  Rodriguez  Marin 
archive (hereinafter AMO). 
 
2. The Identification of Salience of Stakeholders 
Mitchel  et  al.  published  in  1997  a  paper  aimed  to  formulate  a  theory  of  stakeholder 
identification and salience able to explain to whom and to what managers actually pay 
attention. That paper constitutes the theoretical basis used in our work. Michel et al. (1997) 
indicated that the three key attributes of a stakeholder are urgency, legitimacy and power. 
Depending on the combination of these factors, managers will have to pay more or less 
attention to a stakeholder. 
  In  order  to  define  power,  these  authors  follow  Dahl,  1957,  Pfeffer,  1981,  and 
Weber, 1947, describing it as “a relationship among social actors in which a social actor, 
A, can get another social actor, B, to do something that B would not have otherwise done” 
(ib.,  p.  869).  Within  their  framework,  they  use  the  legitimacy  definition  offered  by 
Suchman:  “a  generalized  perception  or  assumption  that  the  actions  of  an  entity  are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (1995, p. 574 quoted in ib., p. 866). Urgency is defined in the 
aforementioned  paper  as  “the  degree  to  which  stakeholder  claims  call  for  immediate 
attention” (ib., p. 869).  
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  The key contribution of Mitchell et al. is the addition of urgency to the list of 
stakeholder  attributes  in  order  to  change  the  model  from  static  to  dynamic  (ib.,  867). 
Moreover, these authors pointed out several additional features of the attributes. First of 
all, they are variable, not a steady state. They can be gained and they can be lost. They are 
socially constructed rather than objective realities. Finally, neither the stakeholder nor the 
managers are always conscious of their attributes. Even if such awareness exists, there is 
not always a wilful exercising of these attributes (ib., 868). 
  Based on these attributes, Mitchell et al. drew up a classification of stakeholders. It 
is  remarkable  that  the  point  is  not  the  existence  or  not  of  the  attribute  but  rather  the 
managerial perception regarding the existence of these attributes. Thus, they define latent 
stakeholders as those for which the manager perceives the presence of only one attribute. 
Expectant stakeholders are those for which the manager perceives the presence of two 
attributes. If the manager perceives the presence of the three attributes, stakeholders are 
named definitive stakeholder.  
  The dynamism of the model allows for stakeholders to change their position in the 
previous  classification  by  gaining  or  losing  attributes.  In  the  first  two  categories,  the 
authors establish sub-sets depending on the perceived attributes. Specifically within the 
category of expectant stakeholders, they distinguish: 
1.  Dominant stakeholders. When the manager perceives the presence of power and 
legitimacy. 
2.  Dependant stakeholders. When the manager perceives the presence of legitimacy 
and urgency. They are called dependant because their lack of power means they 
need  the  help  of  other  groups/individuals  (manager  or  stakeholder)  in  order  to 
achieve their objectives.  
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3.  Dangerous stakeholders. When the manager perceives the presence of power and 
urgency. The absence of legitimacy usually leads to the use of violent and coercive 
measures. 
As  far  as  latent  stakeholders,  they  distinguish:  dormant  stakeholders  if  only  power  is 
perceived; discretionary stakeholders when their only perceived attribute is the legitimacy; 
and  demanding  stakeholders  who  are  those  for  which  urgency  is  the  only  perceived 
attribute. 
  The authors propose that the salience of a stakeholder depends on the combination 
of attributes perceived by the managers (ib. 873). Thus, the level of salience will be high 
for  definitive  stakeholders,  medium  for  expectant  stakeholders  and  low  for  latent 
stakeholders. 
 
3. The Osuna Ducal Estate  
ODE included the group of aristocratic dominions that belonged to the jurisdiction of the 
Dukes of Osuna. Aristocratic dominion did not necessarily imply the ownership of the 
lands but rather the possibility of promulgating rules, collecting taxes, imparting justice in 
the first instance, enjoying several monopolies and the capacity of founding patronages. In 
other  words,  the  Dukes  were  not  the  owners  of  all  the  lands  over  which  they  had 
jurisdiction and they did not have jurisdiction over all the lands they owned. 
  The  ODE  comprised  dominions  located  in  two  separated  areas:  Andalusia  and 
Castile
1 and originally organised into three districts named after their respective capitals: 
Osuna, Ureña and Peñafiel
2. Andalusian territories belonging to ODE together with those 
                                                 
1  Central tableland of Spain. 
2 Osuna included Arahal, Archidona, Morón, Olvera, Ortegicar, Puebla de Cazalla and the capital, all of them 
situated in Andalusia. Ureña and Peñafiel were located in Castile. Gumiel de Izán, Briones and Arévalo  
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of  Medina-Sidonia,  Arcos,  Medinaceli  and  Infantado,  was  one  of  five  big  lordly 
Andalusian dominions of the Ancient Regime. Osuna had the advantage opposite to the 
remaining ones of the proximity of the villas and places that were composing it, forming a 
"continuum territorial” (Atienza, 1987). 
  The ODE was founded in 1562 when King Phillip II bestowed upon Pedro Téllez 
Girón (1531-1562) the title of Duke of Osuna. Previously the Téllez Girón family used the 
title of Count of Ureña, and the first Duke was the fifth Count of Ureña. ODE properties 
were  divided  into  entailed  and  free  goods.  The  entailed  goods  were  included  in  the 
mayorazgo
 3. In the period studied, the ODE was one of the most important aristocratic 
estates  in  Spain  in  terms  of  the  rents  collected.  The  chronicler  Pedro  Núñez  Salcedo 
(quoted by Reglá, 1974, pp. 45-46) realized a list of the most important financiers of Spain 
in the period 1597-1600 figuring Osuna's Estate thirdly with 150.000 ducados of annual 
revenue. Nevertheless, at the end of the 16th century, ODE was strongly indebted, situation 
that was common in the Spanish nobility in that epoch (Domínguez Ortiz, 1983; Yun, 
2002). 
 
4. The Context 
The political and economic situation in Spain underwent changes in the period examined 
here. King Philip III (1578-1621) succeeded his father Phillip II (1527-1598) to the throne. 
                                                                                                                                                    
formed the Peñafiel district and Tiedra, Pobladura, Villafrechos, Villadefrades and Villamuriel made up the 
Ureña district.  
3  The mayorazgo (The Osuna mayorazgo was founded in 1511) was a Spanish legal institution that meant 
that a set of properties was entailed as an indivisible unit. Those goods could not be sold, mortgaged or 
divided unless specific Royal authorisation was granted. The only possible means of transmission was by 
inheritance in favour of the first-born. Its proposal guaranteed that the whole of the family patrimony would 
be kept together.  
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Phillip III had a weak character and granted power to his favourites who became the main 
figures of authority in the Kingdom
4. 
  The agricultural situation is especially important for the purposes of this paper since 
it was the main source of income for the ODE. It suffered stagnation with annual increases 
of between 2% and 4% (Burrell, 1988, p. 440). The agricultural market was regulated. 
Thus, the Government promulgated an official rate, which was the maximum price allowed 
for the sale of wheat and barley. However, at least in the period 1558-1605, the market 
prices of wheat and barley were higher than the official rate (Reglá, 1974, p. 14). 
  During the reigns of Charles V and Phillip II, the nobles retained jurisdictional 
privileges  in  their  districts  but  they  were  kept  away  from  the  Court  and  the  country’s 
affairs of state. As mentioned previously, Phillip III gave his power to the Duke of Lerma 
and from this reign onwards, the Nobility  gained influence and presence in the Court, 
occupying  most  government  positions.  The  influence  of  Spanish  aristocracy  rose 
throughout the 16
th century favoured by their control of the grain market (Bernal, 1983, p. 
250; Yun, 2002, p. 20), and the social alliance with the crown. During the first three reigns 
of the Hapsburg dynasty, the crown, the clergy and the aristocracy owned 95% of Spanish 
lands (Reglá, 1974, p. 24). Aristocracy owned 40% of arable land in Andalusia in the 16
th 
century (Bernal, 1983, p. 260). 
  In spite of their power and influence, most Spanish aristocratic organisations had a 
high level of indebtedness at the end of the 16
th and beginning of the 17
th century
. The 
literature provides different reasons to justify this seemingly contradictory situation. Thus, 
Domínguez Ortiz (1983, p. 301) blames the inappropriate management of patrimonies and 
the high level of non-productive assets. Atienza (1987, p. 339 and following) follows this 
                                                 
4 The Duke of Lerma occupied the position of Head Minister in 1599.  
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opinion  and  adds  other  reasons  such  as  the  necessity  of  providing  economically  for 
relatives excluded from the mayorazgo inheritance and high crown taxes.  
  Yun  (2002),  however,  does  not  agree  with  these  authors  regarding  the 
mismanagement  of  aristocratic  patrimonies.  In  his  view,  there  were  reasons  for 
indebtedness  out  of  the  control  of  their  mangers  such  as  the  social  and  legitimising 
functions of the lordships, the services rendered to the crown or the irregularity of income 
that depended on the circumstances of the agricultural market every year. Furthermore, the 
aristocracy  had  to  pay  out  large  sums  at  specific  moments,  for  instance,  the  dowries 
payable when their daughters married or the aforementioned services to the Crown. 
  Putting the reasons to one side, the fact of the matter is that at the end of the 16
th 
and beginning of the 17
th century, the crown had to help solve the aristocracy’s financial 
problems, by taking its properties into administration and reducing the censos interest rate 
(Domínguez Ortiz, 1985; Yun, 2002). 
 
5. ODE Management 
This section deals with the different administrative rules promulgated for the ODE in the 
period of study. As of 1590, the ducal patrimony was seized by the Crown and managed by 
members of the Council of Castile. This next point deals with that intervention, followed 
by  a  description  of  the  rules  promulgated  for  the  whole  lease  of  the  ducal  patrimony 
carried out as of 1599. As we have said before, the members of the Council of Castile 
appointed  to  administer  the  ducal  patrimony  promulgated  an  Instruction  regarding 
accounting procedures in 1605. The clauses included in this Instruction are studied below. 
The  Duke,  his  creditors,  and  guarantors  reached  an  agreement  in  1606  regarding  the 
administration of the patrimony which was ratified by the Crown. The last point deals with  
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the decision made by the King to assign administration of the ducal patrimony back to the 
dukes. 
 
5.1. Royal Intervention 
The progressive indebtedness of the ODE led creditors and guarantors to lodge complaints 
and initiate several litigation proceedings in different Tribunals. The Crown was interested 
in resolving this problem because the ODE, like other aristocratic estates, was one of the 
politic  and  economical  mainstays  of  the  Crown.  Hence,  its  potential  bankruptcy  and 
disappearance would have negative consequences for the Monarchy. Furthermore, most of 
the Estate’s debts had required royal authorisation since they affected properties entailed 
through mayorazgo.  
  The  Crown  decided  to  seize  the  ducal  patrimony  from  1590  onwards,  and 
promulgated the following rules: 
•  Transferring the management of ducal patrimony to the Council of Castile. They 
did  not  manage  it  directly  but  appointed  an  administrator  in  charge  of  ducal 
patrimony. 
•  Drawing up a rating of creditors to ensure the correct payment of debts. In this 
rating, debts were ordered chronologically. The result of this rating was that in 
1594  ODE  accumulated  194  debts  for  264,992,395  maravedíes  and  had  to  pay 
14,765,726 maravedíes annually in interest. 
•  Limiting proceedings to all the usual tribunals. All cases pertaining to the ODE had 
to be legally brought before the Council of Castile. 
The administrator Cristobal de Auleztia, designated by the Council of Castile, received 
complaints from creditors about the accounts presented by some of the ODE’s collectors.  
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AMO  keeps  several  accounts  submitted  by  collector  of  the  ODE  Andalusian  district 
coming from 1594. During this period, the ODE had a collector in each village of the 
district. This person was in charge of the collections of the rents and the payments related 
to  the  ODE.  Periodically,  irregularly  but  always  for  periods  bigger  than  a  year,  the 
collectors  reported  accounts  to  the  ODE  using  the  system  defined  in  the  Tratado  de 
Cuentas by Diego del Castillo as the Cargo y Descargo. As an example of these accounts, 
we present the informative flows included in the accounts submitted by Rodrigo López, 
Archidona’s collector for the period 1592-93 (Diagram 1). 
 
 
Diagram 1. Example of informative flows of collectors accounts in the period 1590-1594 
 
Thus,  Francisco  de  Santander,  on  his  own  behalf  and  representing  other  creditors, 
presented in 1594 claims about the accounts of Andres Banegas, Olvera’s collector, and 
about Rui Díez Roldan, who was La Puebla’s collector (AMO, file 13 (53)). Santander  
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argued that the mistakes made in the settlement processes harmed his interests and those of 
other  creditors,  so  the  accounts  should  be  re-drawn  up.  Most  of  the  objections  were 
common to both accounts: 
•  The charge should include rents pertaining to 1590 but collected in 1591 since the 
rents pertaining to 1593 but collected in 1594 were not included. By doing this, the 
charge would include a complete period of three years. 
•  During 1591, rents were levied and, therefore, the discharges of this year should not 
be admitted because the Collector could not pay those amounts. 
•  There were previous periods in which the collectors occupied these positions and 
for which there are no settled accounts. 
•  It has taken a single discharge for the whole period for which the creditors could 
have used one-year letters of payment to justify payments in other years. 
•  There were payment receipts signed by unauthorised individuals. 
•  The money received for the sale of wheat and barley was higher than the amount 
charged. That is so because the market price was higher than the official rate and 
the receipts may have been be falsified. 
•  The administrator Cristobal de Auleztia had to pay the ducal family maintenance 
allowance. Thus, these quantities would not be included in the discharge to avoid 
paying it twice. 
Furthermore, in the case of Andres Banegas, the creditor argued that the Olvera Cilla
5 
remained closed for part of the period covered by the accounts. Therefore, the Collector 
must have sold wheat and barley outside of it. These quantities have not been charged. 
 
                                                 
5 A Cilla was a grain warehouse where the ceral that corresponded to the duke’s tithe was deposited.   
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5.2. The whole lease 
Royal intervention was not successful. Management by the Council of Castile did not solve 
the problems of non-payment to the duke’s creditors. Thus, in 1598 the duke’s creditors 
asked the Crown once again to pass new rules about the administration of ducal patrimony. 
  They argued that the accounts submitted by Cristobal de Auleztia, who managed 
the patrimony in the period 1594-96, included collections of one hundred and forty-eight 
million  maravedíes  during  these  three  years.  But  he  had  only  paid  thirty-five  million 
maravedíes in debts and twenty-two in salaries assigned by the duke and Cristobal de 
Auleztia himself; “the rest had been spent in maintenance allowance of the ducal family, 
costs and expenses and on taxes”. They claimed that the appointed administrators were 
only looking for own profit and that, in their opinion, the salaries designed for the Duke’s 
staff  were  excessive.  The  result  of  Royal  Intervention,  according  to  the  creditors’ 
complaints, was an increase in total debt of one hundred and fifty thousand ducados from 
the start of royal administration (in other words 21.23%).  
  The  solution  put  forward  by  the  Crown,  at  the  proposal  of  the  creditors  and 
guarantors, with the agreement of the Duke, was the whole lease of the ducal patrimony. 
The king appointed the Bachelor Tejada, member of the Council of Castile, to organise and 
control the lease.  
  The  minimum  price  fixed  by  Tejada  was  133.000  ducados  annually.  Only  one 
person, Gaspar de Zárate presented an offer and the final price fixed was 138.062 ducados 
every year with 3.000 as prometido
6. The contract was transferred to Hernán Salcedo in 
1604. Upon expiry it was not renewed. Thus, from 1608 Gil Rámirez de Arellano, member 
of the Council of Castile, was appointed to manage the ducal patrimony.   
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According to the Inventory of accounts of 1585-1663 submitted by the leaseholders of the 
whole patrimony, the Bachelor Tejada passed an edict on 7
th September 1601 advising the 
Duke’s accountant to be present at the settlement of accounts for Gaspar de Zárate. 
 
5.3. The 1605 Instruction on Accounting  
Members  of  the  Council  of  Castile  appointed  for  ODE  administration  passed  this 
Instruction  in  Valladolid  on  July  16
th,  1605.  The  first  step  was  to  organise  the  ducal 
dominions into two districts: Andalusia and Castile
7, each one with an Administrator and a 
safe  used  for  the  custodianship  of  ODE  money.  Diagram  2  shows  the  administrative 
organisation of the ducal Estate included in this Instruction. 
 
 
Diagram 2. Organisation chart of the Osuna’s Ducal Estate according to the Instruction of 
1605 (from Atienza, 1987, p. 320) 
                                                                                                                                                    
6  Prometido: Sum given to the bidders in the public auctions for the lease of the royal rents with charge to 
the total of the leased rent.  
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As  far  as  accounting  documentation  is  concerned,  the  Instruction  indicated  that  each 
district should draw up: 
1.  Account and Reason Book for the amounts deposited in the safe. 
2.  Current Account Book for the amounts deposited in the safe. 
3.  Account and Reason Book for payments. 
4.  Implicitly,  the  Instruction  mentions  the  accounts  settled  in  the  safe  because  the 
former book should be used to control the discharge of that account. 
5.  Biannual report on the profit, value and leasing of rents. 
6.  Biannual report of the amounts deposited and paid for the safe and overdue credits. 
The Osuna district should also draw up a biannual list of the surplus sent to the 
Court safe. 
Diagram 3 shows the flow of information included in the rule. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
7  Where the districts of Peñafiel and Ureña were joined.  
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Diagram 3. Information flows included in the Instruction on Accounting of 1605 
 
The  members  of  the  Council  of  Castile,  Diego  López  de  Ayala,  Pedro  de  Tapia  and 
Fernando Carrillo signed the Instruction. On the same date, the judges added the following 
rules regarding the way in which payments should be authorised: 
i.  All debts should be settled in the presence of the official in charge of sequestered 
property and the Accountants. Payments shall be made to each creditor as seen fit 
according to their credit and rating. 
ii.  All payments had to be approved by the administration board. Accountants should 
report the leasing of any debt and the position assigned according to the rating. The 
relevant payment authorisation had to be issued, for which the accountants had to 
provide justification from the credit and debit book for the District. Accounts entries  
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for payments were made according to the lists sent by treasurers of the safes to the 
board so that these amounts could be released to the Accountants. 
Finally, the judges ordered the Accountants to draw up a new rating of creditors (since the 
current one was incomplete) accompanied by the defensor de bienes (official in charge of 
sequestered  property)  of  Castile.  This  new  rating  should  be  a  correspondent  to  the 
administration board, to be inscribed in the books and sent to the Safes
8. Apart from the 
new debts rating, we do not have evidence of the fulfilment of this Instruction. In fact, little 
later the Duke and his creditors reached an agreement to change the form of management 
of the ducal patrimony. 
 
5.4. Agreements with creditors 
The ODE’s creditors and guarantors reached an agreement with the Duke regarding the 
management of ducal patrimony because they were not satisfied with the result achieved 
by the whole lease of the patrimony. This agreement was signed in Brussels on February 
9
th, 1604 and its signatories required royal authorisation and ratification. 
  In the prologue to his Ratification Order (SNAHN, Osuna, file 3433/13), the King 
tackled the failure of the previous system of management, which he laid at the door of 
those members of the Council of Castile who were in charge of all matters pertaining to the 
ducal patrimony, having limited the ordinary tribunals: 
“And although it was passed so that the Estate would be better managed and the 
outstanding debts paid without the costs previously entailed by collection, not only 
                                                 
8  This  new  creditors  rating  (SNAHN,  Osuna,  file  1.494  (3))  registered  350  debts  with  a  capital  of 
383.591.939 maravedíes and the payment of 21.498.920 of maravedíes in annual interest. That meant a rise 
of 80.41% in the number of debts, 44.76% in capital and 45.60% in interest in relation to the rating of 1594. 
However not all of this increase was due to new debts but rather to the inclusion in the 1606 rating of debts  
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were these objectives not achieved, but the experience shows the great damage that 
has been done by placing the administration in the hands of strangers”. 
Through  the  administration  provided  in  the  first  five  years,  more  than  30  million 
maravedíes were lost and nearly uncollected. The patrimony was leased at such a low price 
and under delusory conditions that by this point at least 250,000 ducados
9 had been lost. 
The leaseholder had been in prison for over a year in relation to a sum of more than 28 
million  maravedíes.  The  debts  from  mortgages  had  increased  in  excess  of  250,000 
ducados. When the ODE was taken into administration by the Council of Castile, the rents 
added up to nearly 60.000 ducados/year and the debts were for no more than three years. 
By the time of the agreement, there were creditors with debts owing of up to 15 years and 
no creditor had debts for less than five years.  
  It was harmful to have negotiated with so many ministers who were so important 
that, try as they might, they simply could not meet up as often as they needed to because of 
their high-profile occupations. Therefore the system was by no means an improvement: it 
was very expensive and rather than solving problems they were exacerbated.  
  The solution agreed with the Duke and the creditors was that an individual with a 
personal but unselfish interest in the matter should be appointed to administer the Estate. 
The person chosen was the Count of Haro, cousin to the Duke, granted the authority to 
govern and manage the ducal estate for a specific period of time. The order of payments 
stipulated in the agreement is quite remarkable, pushing creditors down to last place: 
a)  Maintenance allowance for the ducal family, (the Duke, the Duchess, and two 
nuns, the Duke’s daughter and sister respectively). 
                                                                                                                                                    
prior to 1594 but not included in the first rating. In fact, 23 debts originated in the period 1599-1606 with a 
total capital sum of 17.752.110 maravedíes and 888.628 maravedíes in annual interest. 
9 Accounting unit equivalent to 11 Reales (1 Real = 34 Maravedíes).  
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b)  Situados to the Church of Seville and Malaga and salaries of the priests at the 
Collegiate Church of Osuna and other priests paid by the Duke.  
c)  The  Count’s  payroll  and  drafts,  having  reported  to  the  ducal  Accounting 
Office. 
d)  Maintenance and repairs of the properties. 
e)  Expenses of legal cases including salaries of the agents and attorneys.  
f)  Mortgage interest paid in the city where the Duke was bound, without cost to 
the creditors. If the collectors or leaseholders did not meet these payments, the 
creditors could bring a lawsuit in the tribunals to claim for these payments and 
rents as of the day on which the Count ordered payment. The costs of these 
actions would be payable by the leaseholders or collectors. 
This agreement was ratified by the King on September 11
th, 1606, imposing a requirement 
for authorisation from the Council of Castile in terms of: 
i)  The possible sale of free properties. 
ii)  Dropping cases to recover properties or claiming debts. 
iii)  Possible increases in the allowance assigned to the ducal family.  
From that moment, the members of the Council of Castile no longer managed the ducal 
patrimony or dealt with claims related to it; hence creditors could turn to the Tribunals. 
 
5.5. The return of patrimonial administration 
On May 22
nd, 1633, the King signed an Order returning patrimonial administration to the 
Duke. This same document recognised that the problems of indebtedness had not been 
resolved: “According to the accountants’ reports in 1606 overdue interest stood at 200,000 
ducados and by 1633 the sum had reached more than 450,000 ducados” (SNAHN, Osuna,  
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file 15 (16)). The order maintained the conditions of the 1606 agreement and the Duke had 
to  spend  4,000  ducados  every  year  repaying  mortgages.  The  creditors  appointed  a 
representative in the ducal patrimony administration. The timeframe for this arrangement 
was from 1633 to 1639. 
  The return of direct management was extended in 1639 (for the period 1640-48) 
and in 1647 (for a further nine years). In both cases (SNAHN, Osuna, files 15 (20) and 16 
(4)), the extensions were justified in terms of the services rendered by the Duke to the 
Crown,  providing  soldiers  to  fight  on  his  behalf.  The  first  document  mentioned  the 
creditors’ satisfaction with the direct management arrangement. 
 
6. Discussion 
From its origin, accounting played an important role in all the changes happened in ODE 
management from the Royal Intervention until the return of patrimonial administration to 
the dukes. Accounting was present throughout the process as a legitimating element of the 
creditors’ complaints. They complained about the accounts rendered by collectors (section 
5.1), and argued the failure of the whole lease being based on the accounts of the lessor 
(section 5.2). This legitimating role of accounting was even recognised by the King who 
referred to the reports of the book-keepers when returning patrimonial administration to the 
Duke, though ultimately his criterion was based on gratitude for the services rendered by 
the Dukes (section 5.5).  
  On the other way, accounting was the striking point of the changes promoted by 
Council  of  Castile  in  the  1605  Instruction.  This  rule  was  attempting  to  introduce  new 
accounting methods and, overall, increasing the frequency of required accounting reports. 
This  is  an  evidence  of  the  belief  among  members  of  the  Council  of Castile  about  the  
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possible contribution of accounting to improve the situation of the ODE patrimony (section 
5.3). 
In terms of stakeholder approach, the situation of the ODE patrimony previously to 
the Royal seizure could be defined as follows: i) The Duke administered ODE patrimony, 
ii) the Crown was a stakeholder within in the social system of the period, endowed with 
power and legitimacy, making it a dominant stakeholder. The Crown could affect the ODE 
and  any  organisation  in  this  period  through  absolutism.  It  could  be  affected  by  ODE 
because  aristocratic  organizations  were  one  of  its  mainstays  that  supported  the  social 
system of the period. In this social situation, the Crown had no urgent claims to make of 
the  Duke  in  relation  to  ODE  patrimony  management.  iii)  Creditors  could  affect  the 
organisation  by  withholding  further  credit  and  they  could  in  turn  be  affected  by  the 
performance of the ODE because if the organisation had no surplus, they could not collect 
their loan interests. Creditors were initially in a situation of discretionary stakeholders. 
They had legitimacy because of their loan contracts. In fact, they had legitimacy as regards 
both the Duke and the Crown because the mortgages on properties linked to mayorazgo 
required  royal  authorisation.  Thus,  they  stood  by  royal  protection  when  they  granted 
financial aid to the ODE. When non-payment occurred, they had urgent claims to make, 
which turned them into dependent stakeholders. According to Mitchel et al. (1997), they 
needed the coalition of a powerful stakeholder in order to achieve their objectives. Thus, 
they went to the tribunals and they achieved the exclusion of rents in the years 1590 and 
1591.  
  The  dire  economic  situation  of  the  ODE  meant  that  the  Crown  had  an  urgent 
interest in resolving its problems; thus, the Crown became a definitive stakeholder because 
it had power, legitimacy and, now, urgency. The solution adopted was the royal seizure of  
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patrimony. Thus, as of 1590, in terms of the stakeholder classification, the new situation 
was as follows. The Duke became a discretionary stakeholder because he had legitimacy as 
the  patrimony  owner.  The  existence  of  mayorazgo  that  ensured  he  would  keep  the 
patrimony and collect some income, the maintenance allowance, reduced his urgency. His 
power was restricted by the royal seizure. The Crown, in a broad sense, including the King 
in person and the Council of Castile, became the ODE patrimonial administrator. Finally, 
the creditors became dominant stakeholders. They had the legitimacy of the loan contracts 
drawn up with royal authorisation. They had power through the cases they won in the 
tribunals and above all because their aim to avoid ODE bankruptcy coincided with that of 
the Crown. As a consequence of this new attributes: 
i)  When  the  Duke  wanted  to  become  involved  in  the  administration  of  his 
patrimony, he became a dependent stakeholder because he added urgency to his 
legitimacy. Thus, he needed the coalition of other stakeholders to achieve his 
objectives. In the agreement of 1606 he gained the possibility to increase his 
influence on patrimonial management, through the position of his cousin, and 
the possibility to increase his maintenance allowance. To do this, he needed the 
support of the creditors to obtain royal authorisation. In 1633, the King returned 
to the Duke the management of the ducal patrimony but the conditions of this 
return specified the amounts allocated to the annual payment of mortgages and 
interest (SNAHN, Osuna, file 15 (16)). In 1640, the King extended the Duke’s 
direct  management  of  the  ducal  patrimony  on  the  grounds  of  the  services 
rendered  by  the  Duke  and  the  creditors’  satisfaction  with  the  arrangement 
(SNAHN, Osuna, files 15 (20)).   
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ii) When the creditors’ claims attained a level of urgency, in other words, when 
they were unable to collect their interest, they became definitive stakeholders 
and managed to force several changes in the management of ducal patrimony, 
the  whole  lease  of  1599,  the  1605  Instruction  on  Accounting,  the  1606 
agreement between the Duke and his creditors and the non-renewal of the whole 
lease  from  1608.  The  legitimacy  of  their  complaints  was  supported  by 
accounting information from the ducal household. 
Summarising,  the  management  changes  that  took  place  in  the  ODE  between  the  years 
1605-1617 were the result of pressure from a group of stakeholders, the creditors, who 
became  definitive  stakeholders  when  they  embodied  all  three  key  attributes:  power, 
legitimacy and urgency. After the changes, their situation improved, they lost urgency and 
returned to the status of dominant stakeholders. But one has to bear in mind that in the 
social  system  of  the  period  the  only  absolute  power  resided  with  the  King.  Thus,  the 
creditors had power depending on the King’s will; indeed, it could be said that they took 
advantage of the fact that their objectives coincided with the Crown and used its power 
indirectly.  Thus,  they  could  at  any  point  have  become  discretionary  or  dependent 
stakeholder. Furthermore, we would argue that the creditors were aware of their limited 
power because i) In the agreement of 1606 they agreed to occupy last place in the order of 
payments  (see  section  5.4)  and  ii)  they  accepted  the  return  of  ducal  patrimonial 
administration even though the indebtedness problems had not actually been resolved (see 
section 5.5). 
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7. Concluding remarks 
Therefore, the stakeholder approach is able to explain sufficiently the changes that took 
place in the management of ODE in the 16
th and 17
th centuries and the role of accounting 
in all these changes.  
  Accounting literature has used stakeholders approach until now to explain changes 
in business firms characterised by the look for  profits framed in a capitalist economic 
context. However, the importance of agents related to the firm apart from shareholders is in 
the start point of stakeholder approach. In fact, the vagueness or stakeholder definition is 
one  of  the  problems  that  impelled  Mitchel  et  al  to  formulate  a  theory  of  stakeholder 
identification and salience: “Persons, groups, neighbourhoods, organizations, institutions, 
societies  and  even  the  natural  environment”  (p.857)  have  been  identified  as  potential 
stakeholders in some moment. In this sense, the accuracy of stakeholders approach in a 
non-capitalist  context  could  be  hoped.  Following  this,  the  case  of  ODE  proves  the 
availability of stakeholder approach to explain management changes in private patrimonies 
embedded in a non capitalism context and dealing with organisations whose objectives 
were not the look for profits. You have to take in mind that as well as ODE as its creditors 
were mainly rentier organizations. 
  On the other hand, research works that have used stakeholders’ approach, as well in 
accounting  literature  as  in  other  management  topics,  have  focused  until  now  on  20th 
century with only one exception referred to the final years of 19th century. This paper uses 
stakeholders approach to explain accounting and management changes happened at the end 
of 16th century and beginning of 17th century.  
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